

ER

19 AUG 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: The Position of Propaganda and the Mechanism therefor in the Soviet System

1. You recently requested our advice with respect to:

- a. the structure and direction of the Soviet Propaganda apparatus, and,
- b. the feasibility of reaching an effective agreement with the USSR concerning "war propaganda".

2. With respect to the first question, a primary tenet of Marxism-Leninism is that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union guides, and directs all state activity--a situation formally recognized by Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution. Agitprop is the section of the Communist Party Central Committee which directs Soviet propaganda and agitation both within the Soviet Union and throughout the world. The government of the USSR and its apparatus hence might be viewed from the propaganda standpoint as simply an elaborate "Front Organization" to carry out Party directives.

3. In respect to the second question, even assuming that an agreement comparable to the UN resolution of November 1947 on propaganda could be reached with the USSR, we do not believe it would be an effective accord. It is not conceivable that the Soviet leaders would admit full control over the numerous and varied organs at their disposal, i. e. the State and Party organs of the Satellites, the Free World Communist Parties and Front Organizations. In this context, it should be noted that the Soviet Union and other member nations

(EXECUTIVE RESISTANCE FILE *State*)

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are already bound in principle to the unanimous resolution on propaganda made in the UN General Assembly of November 1947. The USSR lack of adherence to this resolution is common history.

4. I am forwarding a study which has been prepared in accordance with your request which consists of the following items:

- a. Summary entitled "War Propaganda"  
Summit Agenda Item
- b. Summary of Second Regular Session  
UN General Assembly Discussions on Propaganda  
(Sept. 18 - Nov. 8, 1947) (Tab A)
- c. Direction and Organization of Soviet Propaganda  
(Tab B)
- d. Projected International Communist Journal  
(Tab C)

You may wish to have your experts review this material.

Signed

**ALLEN W. DULLES**  
Director

Attachments

SECRET

Signature Recommended:

[Redacted Signature]

15 AUG 1958

Deputy Director (Plans)

DD/P/PP/PYD

[Redacted]

(14 Aug 1958)

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Director

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**Signature Recommended:**

(Signed) Richard Helms

15 AUG 1958

Deputy Director (Plans)

DD/P/ [ ] pcc (14 Aug 1958)

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"War Propaganda" Summit Agenda Item

1. Under the agenda point suggested by the Soviets in reference to "war propaganda," a workable agreement which would benefit the U. S. could probably not be reached because it is assumed that the Soviet tactic will be to obtain an indirect admission by the U. S. representatives to the effect that the U. S. has in the past engaged in "war propaganda" and will desist in the future as a result of Soviet pressure. In this context it should be noted that the Soviet Union and other member nations are already bound in principle to the unanimous resolution of the UN General Assembly of November 8, 1947 on propaganda. Their lack of adherence to this resolution is common history.
2. A discussion of what type of agreement could conceivably be made with the Soviets concerning propaganda must commence with a definition of terms. This would most probably invite distinctions and generate dispute over the difference between war propaganda and propaganda, per se, as defined in the Communist lexicon and in accordance with Western experience. The Soviet tactic would probably be to entangle the U. S. representatives in a discussion of alleged U. S. acts of aggression and subversion directed at the Soviet-Sino Bloc paralleling the debate in the UN General Assembly September 18-November 8, 1947 (see Tab A). While this position could be effectively countered in setting out Soviet/Communist acts of aggression and subversion, it is not probable that such discussions would lead to an effective agreement.
3. Assuming, however, that any agreement even comparable to the UN resolution of November 8, 1947 could be reached, the question then arises as to what mechanisms available to the Soviets could be bound by the agreement. Classically, within the Soviet Union the acts of the Party and of the State though admittedly intertwined and led by the Party, are separable (see Tab B). It is probable, however, that an agreement reached with the individual who is both chief of the Party and chief of State would be binding upon the State and, if sufficiently explicit, upon the Party. It is not conceivable that the Soviet leaders would admit full control over the multifarious other organs available to them, i. e., the State and Party organs of the satellites, the Free World Communist Parties, front organizations, and, when reinstated, the successor to the Cominform journal and its apparatus (see Tab C). At the most, the Soviet leaders could only agree to use their best efforts to influence these organizations to comply with the propaganda agreement.
4. The corollary to such a Soviet agreement, a similar agreement on the part of the Free World, would be complicated by the role of the Free Press and by the independent position of other Free World governments not party to the agreement.

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Tab A

TAB  
A

SUMMARY OF SECOND REGULAR SESSION UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
DISCUSSIONS ON PROPAGANDA (SEPT. 18 - NOV. 8, 1947)

Measures to be Taken Against Propaganda and the Inciters of a New War

In the course of the general debate, at the 84th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, on September 18, 1947, the representative of the USSR stated that his delegation believed it necessary to raise before the General Assembly the important question of measures to be taken against the steadily increasing propaganda in favor of a new war. The war psychosis, which, the representative of the USSR declared, was being instigated by militarist and expansionist circles in certain countries and particularly in the United States, was continually spreading and assuming a more threatening character. All means of psychological influence were being used -- newspapers, magazines, radio and films -- with the aim of preparing world public opinion for a new war. But the purpose of all this propaganda was the same, namely to justify the furious armament race which was being carried on by the United States, including the production of atomic weapons; to justify the limitless desires of influential circles in the United States to carry out its expansionist plans, the keystone of which was a senseless plan of world domination.

The warmongers were indulging in propaganda about the alleged necessity of fighting a war danger supposed to come from other countries. They were trying to frighten people by vicious fabrications about alleged preparations by the USSR to attack the United States, although they knew only too well that the USSR was not threatening an attack on any country, but on the contrary, was devoting all its forces to the cause of rehabilitation of the areas destroyed or damaged by the war and that the whole population of the USSR -- workers, peasants, intellectuals -- unanimously condemned any attempt to bring about a new war. Although the USSR was engaged exclusively in the work of peaceful reconstruction, the warmongers stubbornly preached that a new war was inevitable in order to forestall the alleged aggressive policies of the USSR and of other eastern European countries.

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Contending that preparation for a new war had already passed the stage of propaganda, the representative of the USSR stated that military and technical measures were being put into effect, such as the construction of new military bases, the redeployment of armed forces in accordance with the plans of future military operations, and the manufacture of new armaments on an expanded scale. Simultaneously, military blocs and so-called agreements for mutual defense were being concluded and measures for the unification of armaments were being elaborated.

The representative of the USSR stated that the representatives of American capitalist monopolies were most active in the promotion of war propaganda and he cited figures to show huge profits made by American corporations during the war. Having secured decisive influence during the war, the capitalist monopolies had retained this influence. The thousands of millions of governmental subsidies and protection which the monopolies enjoyed were facilitated by their close connection with senators and members of the Government, many of whom were officials in the monopolistic corporations.

The quest of the capitalist monopolies for profits, the efforts made to preserve and expand at all costs those branches of war industry which enable them to make large profits, could not but influence the direction of the foreign policy and strengthen the military expansionist and aggressive tendencies of this policy to satisfy the ever-growing appetites of the industrial monopolist circles. Such was the fertile ground for war propaganda. The exponents of that propaganda were not only high-ranking representatives of influential American industrial and military circles, influential organs of the press and highly placed politicians, but also official representatives of the United States Government. In this connection he named some highly responsible American officials who, he stated, had no scruples, not only in making deliberately slanderous attacks on the Soviet Union and the countries with new democracies, but also urged systematically the inevitability and necessity of a new war.

The representative of the USSR also stated that large press organs, owned or controlled by American capitalists, were waging war propaganda, and that various scientific institutions and universities in the United States were also guilty of spreading such propaganda. The most important thing was not that such propaganda was made, but that it met with no real rebuff, thus encouraging the instigators of a new war to still further provocations.

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American reactionaries, however, were not alone in their efforts, the representative of the USSR declared. Certain British circles were also working against the cause of peace and a warmongering campaign had been carried on for a long time in Turkey. This "provocative hubbub" was being vigorously supported by the Greek reactionary press.

The representative of the USSR considered it a matter of urgency that the United Nations should adopt measures directed against war propaganda. He therefore submitted the following draft resolution (A/BUR/86) for consideration by the General Assembly:

"1. The United Nations condemn the criminal propaganda for a new war carried on by reactionary circles in a number of countries and, in particular, in the United States of America, Turkey and Greece, by the dissemination of all types of fabrications through the press, radio, cinema, and public speeches, containing open appeals for aggression against the peace-loving democratic countries.

"2. The United Nations regard the toleration of, and -- even more so -- support for this type of propaganda for a new war, which will inevitably become the third world war, as a violation of the obligation assumed by the Members of the United Nations whose Charter calls upon them 'to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace' and not to endanger 'international peace and security, and justice' (Article 1, paragraph 2; Article 2, paragraph 3).

"3. The United Nations deem it essential that the Governments of all countries be called upon to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalties, the carrying on of war propaganda in any form, and to take measures with a view to the prevention and suppression of war propaganda as anti-social activity endangering the vital interests and well-being of the peace-loving nations.

"4. The United Nations affirm the necessity for the speediest implementation of the decision taken by the General Assembly on 14 December 1946 on the reduction of armaments,<sup>6c</sup> and the decision of the General Assembly of 24 January 1946 concerning the exclusion from national armaments of the atomic weapon and all other main types of armaments designed for mass destruction,<sup>7c</sup> and considers that the implementation of these decisions is in the interests of all peace-loving nations and would be a most powerful blow at propaganda and the inciters of a new war. "

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At its 38th meeting on September 21, 1947, the General Committee decided unanimously and without discussion to recommend that the USSR proposal be included in the agenda of the second session of the General Assembly. The General Assembly adopted the General Committee's recommendation at its 91st plenary meeting on September 23, 1947, and referred the USSR proposal to the First Committee for consideration and report.

The First Committee considered the matter at its 79th meeting on October 22, its 80th and 81st meetings on October 23, its 82nd and 83rd meetings on October 24, its 85th meeting on October 25 and its 86th meeting on October 27.

Opening the discussion at the 79th meeting of the First Committee on October 22, 1947, the representative of the USSR stated that various reasons had been invented to oppose the USSR proposal by reactionaries who saw their warmongering business endangered. For instance, the suppression of war propaganda by law was declared incompatible with fundamental human rights and with freedom of speech and of the press. The instigation of war, however, the representative of the USSR considered, was a crime against humanity and must not be masked by the cry that censorship was incompatible with human rights. The legal suppression of war propaganda had nothing to do with freedom of the press or democratic rights. A free press in civilized countries did not preclude limitations imposed in the interest of society, public morals and public welfare. Hence, the assertion that the legal suppression of war propaganda violated democratic principles was inadmissible and was a mere pretext to justify unwillingness to put an end to such propaganda.

The majority of representatives agreed that the United Nations should condemn war propaganda because such propaganda was detrimental to friendly relations among nations. They objected, however, to the form of the USSR resolution. The terms of that resolution and the vehement arguments of the USSR representatives in its support, it was maintained, were in direct contradiction with the aims of the resolution. It appeared, certain delegates opposing the USSR resolution contended, that the USSR delegation was more interested in the propaganda value of its resolution than in curing the evil itself. The USSR resolution it was objected further, contained an unjustified attack against certain countries. The representatives of the United States, Turkey and Greece in particular protested against the accusations brought forward against their countries.

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69. Resolution 41 (I): See Year Book of the United Nations, 1946-47, p. 139.

70. Resolution 1 (I): See ibid., p. 64.

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As to the proposal that the United Nations call upon the governments of all countries to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalties, the carrying on of war propaganda, it was maintained that such a provision constituted a violation of the freedom of the press, and the majority of representatives asserted that their governments would not tolerate a form of censorship such as this proposal implied. In democratic countries with an uncontrolled press, it was maintained, self-discipline and not coercion must form the basis of control. While it was admitted that certain individuals or newspapers might abuse their freedom, it was charged that the press of the USSR and of other Eastern European countries had engaged in a violent campaign of propaganda against the United States and countries of Western Europe. Such propaganda, it was maintained, was of a much more serious nature, for under a system where the government controlled the press, such propaganda could not be engaged in without the consent or direct support of the government concerned. Opponents of the USSR proposal also pointed out the difficulty of defining warmongering. They questioned whether any criticism of the USSR was to be prohibited as war propaganda, while the USSR press was to be permitted to engage in violent criticism of the alleged warmongers. The accusations directed against the United States and certain other countries, it was maintained, were but another form of war propaganda.

As to the last paragraph of the USSR resolution, it was maintained that there was no relation between the question of war propaganda and the question of disarmament and atomic control. The implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions 1 (I) of January 24 and 41 (I) of December 14, 1946, concerning atomic control and disarmament, was entrusted to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. If the work of these bodies had not been more successful to date, this was to a considerable extent, it was charged, the fault of the USSR itself, which had not agreed to any system of effective international control.

The representatives of Poland, the Ukrainian SSR, Yugoslavia, the Byelorussian SSR and Czechoslovakia supported the USSR resolution. They maintained that it would be a mistake to dismiss the arguments advanced by the USSR and that positive action should be taken for the prohibition of war propaganda. The USSR proposal, they considered, was not intended to interfere with freedom of the press. It merely called for concerted action to prevent flagrant abuses of it. Although many representatives had asserted that their governments would not tolerate censorship of the press, the representatives supporting the USSR

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proposal maintained that in capitalist countries a few large corporations owned or controlled the press and imposed, in some cases, a censorship more stringent than that which might be imposed by governments in the interests of the general welfare. A certain amount of governmental control over the press was considered necessary and desirable to prevent abuses and to ensure the dissemination of true facts.

As to the last paragraph of the USSR resolution it was maintained that moral and material disarmament should proceed together and that consequently there was a link between the proposal that war propaganda be curbed and the implementation of the disarmament resolution.

A number of representatives, and in particular the United States representative, considered that the USSR resolution should be rejected and that the First Committee should not give it so much recognition as to amend it, because it diverted attention from the real task before the United Nations, which was to remove the causes of war. If there was intemperate and provocative talk, this was but a superficial symptom of the clash of national interests which was hindering the development of the United Nations. The proper solution therefore was to pursue the practical program of establishing collective security and of economic and social reconstruction.

Other representatives, however, maintained that it would be undesirable for the First Committee to adopt a purely negative attitude with regard to the USSR proposal just because certain parts of it were not acceptable. The subject with which it dealt, these representatives considered, was of such importance that the General Assembly should adopt a positive resolution, which would show the world that the United Nations was doing everything humanly possible to avert the tragedy of a third world war. Hence the representatives of Australia, Canada and France submitted alternative proposals.

At the 79th meeting of the First Committee on October 22, the representative of Australia submitted the following proposal (A/C.1/219) in the form of an amendment to the USSR draft resolution:

"Whereas in the Charter of the United Nations the peoples express their determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security: and

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"Whereas it is the intention of the Charter that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest for the suppression of acts of aggression through the machinery of the Security Council, or in exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense against an armed attack until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security; and

"Whereas the Charter also calls not only for the promotion of universal respect for, but also observance of, fundamental freedoms including freedom of expression, all Members having pledged themselves in Article 56 to take joint and separate action for such observance of fundamental freedoms,

#### **The General Assembly**

"1. Condemns all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, designed to encourage any act of aggression or the use of any measures for the purpose of aggression.

"2. Condemns all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which falsely imputes to officials or other responsible persons of any nation the desire of encouraging any act of aggression or the use of any measures for the purpose of aggression.

"3. Requests the Government of each Member to take appropriate steps to counter all such propaganda, not by resorting to any form of censorship of organs of expression, but

"(a) by taking positive measures to encourage the fair and accurate reporting of official and other statements affecting international relations made by officials or other responsible persons whether of the Member or of any other nation;

"(b) by encouraging the dissemination of all information designed to give expression to the undoubted desire of all peoples to avoid a third world war.

"4. Directs that this resolution be communicated to the forthcoming Conference on Freedom of Information, with a recommendation that the Conference seek to devise practical methods for carrying out the purposes of this resolution."

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At the 81st meeting of the First Committee on October 23, the representative of Canada submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/220) which provided that "the United Nations condemn all propaganda inciting to aggressive war or civil strife which might lead to war, and urge Members to promote, by all means of publicity and propaganda available to them, friendly relations among nations on the basis of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter."

At the 81st meeting of the First Committee on October 24, the representative of France submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/221) which contained a somewhat shorter preamble than the Australian resolution and which provided that

"The General Assembly

"1. Condemns all manifestations and all propaganda, in all countries and in any form, likely to provoke or encourage threats to the peace;

"2. Expresses the hope that the Conference on Freedom of Information to be held in 1948 will study the present resolution and make recommendations thereon."

At the same meeting the representative of Venezuela submitted a proposal (A/C.1/223) that a sub-committee be established to study the various proposals which had been submitted and to submit a draft resolution harmonizing the various points of view.

The representatives of Canada, the United States, Greece and the United Kingdom opposed the establishment of a subcommittee. They believed that a vote should be taken on the USSR proposal. If the latter were not adopted a drafting sub-committee might be established to coordinate the proposals of the representatives of Canada, Australia and France. The representatives of Turkey expressed the view that the USSR resolution, because of its political character, could not be examined by a sub-committee, which was necessarily technical in character.

The representative of the USSR considered that all resolutions which had been submitted should be examined together by a sub-committee in order to work out a common text. He indicated that the USSR delegation would, for example, be prepared to give favorable consideration to the first paragraph of the French resolution.

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At its 85th meeting on October 25, the First Committee voted on the Venezuelan proposal for the establishment of a sub-committee. The proposal was rejected by a vote of 29 to 12 with 12 abstentions. The representative of Venezuela stated that, in view of the statement made by the representative of the USSR before the vote, he felt that the representatives who had voted against the establishment of a sub-committee were not trying to reconcile the point of view of the USSR and the other delegations. Such action, he considered, did not contribute to international cooperation.

At the 86th meeting of the First Committee on October 27, 1947, the representatives of Australia, Canada and France submitted a joint draft resolution (A/C.1/224) to replace their three separate proposals. At the same time the representative of Poland submitted an amendment (A/C.1/225) to the USSR resolution to replace the first paragraph of that resolution by a text identical with the first paragraph of the joint resolution of the representatives of Australia, Canada, and France. The representative of Poland hoped that the elimination of the accusations contained in the first paragraph of the USSR resolution would render that resolution acceptable to the majority of the Committee.

The representative of the USSR expressed the view that it was essential for the General Assembly, in condemning all war propaganda, to indicate where it originated. He therefore considered that the Polish text was inadequate and would be more effective if it included reference to the countries where war propaganda was rampant. As the Polish amendment, however, did condemn war propaganda in general, which was the basic aim of his delegation, the representative of the USSR stated he was prepared to accept the amendment.

Certain representatives declared that they were willing to accept the USSR proposal as modified by the amendment of the representative of Poland. The majority of representatives, however, declared that they could not accept the USSR proposal in its amended form, because they were opposed to the other provisions of that resolution and not only to the first paragraph.

The representatives of France and the United Kingdom suggested that the representative of the USSR withdraw his resolution, in view of the fact that he was willing to support the Polish amendment, which was identical with the essential part of the joint resolution of the representatives of Australia, Canada and France. The representative of the USSR replied that he was willing to accept the Polish amendment, but could not agree to withdraw his resolution.

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71 - The joint resolution was adopted with minor amendments.



The USSR resolution as amended by the representative of Poland was voted upon in parts. The first paragraph was rejected by a vote of 23 to 18, with 14 abstentions; the second paragraph by a vote of 28 to 9, with 18 abstentions; the third paragraph by a vote of 42 to 6, with 6 abstentions; and the fourth paragraph by a vote of 40 to 7, with 7 abstentions. The Chairman ruled that in view of the rejection of each of the four paragraphs of the USSR resolution, it was not necessary to vote on the resolution as a whole.

The Committee then proceeded to consider the joint draft resolution of the representatives of Australia, Canada and France. The representative of the USSR introduced two amendments (A/C. 1/226, A/C. 1/227) to the joint resolution stressing that freedom of speech should not be used for purposes of war propaganda, but on the contrary should be used to fight against such propaganda and that Member States should take steps to counteract such propaganda. These amendments were rejected by the Committee. Certain minor amendments to the second and third paragraphs of the joint resolution proposed by the representatives of the United States (A/C. 1/228) and Australia were adopted.

Voting paragraph by paragraph, the First Committee then adopted the joint resolution as amended by the representatives of the United States and Australia. The resolution as a whole was adopted unanimously by a vote of 56 in favor, one Member being absent.

At its 108th plenary meeting on November 8, 1947, the General Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution recommended by the First Committee. The text of the resolution (110(II)) follows:

"Whereas in the Charter of the United Nations the peoples express their determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and

"Whereas the Charter also calls for the promotion of universal respect for, and observance of, fundamental freedoms which include freedom of expression, all Members having pledged themselves in Article 56 to take joint and separate action for such observance of fundamental freedoms,

The General Assembly

S-E-C-R-E-T

"1. Condemns all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression;

"2. Requests the Government of each Member to take appropriate steps within its constitutional limits;

"(a) To promote, by all means of publicity and propaganda available to them, friendly relations among nations based upon the Purposes and Principles of the Charter;

"(b) To encourage the dissemination of all information designed to give expression to the undoubted desire of all peoples for peace;

"3. Directs that this resolution be communicated to the forthcoming Conference on Freedom of Information.

Direction and Organization of Soviet Propaganda

The Soviet government is an instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. That the party guides and directs state activity, and indeed all phases of Soviet life, is a primary tenet of Marxism-Leninism. The subordination of government to the party was clearly defined by Stalin, who stated in his Problems of Leninism that "the Party verifies the work of the organs of government and the organs of authority, correcting unavoidable mistakes and shortcomings, helping them develop the decisions of the government . . . and not a single important decision is taken by them without corresponding directions of the Party." In developing the plan of work of an organ of state authority, he added, "the Party gives general guiding directions defining the character and direction of the work of these organs. . ."

The Soviet Constitution formally recognizes this situation (Article 126) in the familiar clause which states that "the most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state."

Soviet Party and state are unified today in the person of Khrushchev, who like Stalin, is both first secretary and premier. As premier, he implements the policies whose formulation he "guides and directs" in his capacity as party chief. Under him, an interlocking directorate, comprising several of the top members of the hierarchy, hold key positions in the government (Council of Ministers) and also in the leading policy making body, the party presidium.

Agitprop, the section of the Communist Party Central Committee which directs Soviet propaganda and agitation within the Soviet Union and throughout the world, operates directly under the Central Committee Presidium and Secretariat. P. N. Pospelov, candidate member of the Presidium and a Party secretary, is presumed to have over-all supervision of the Agitprop mechanism which disseminates the propaganda lines decided upon within the Presidium.

Agitprop functions as planner, director and watchdog of all Communist media, both within and outside the Soviet Union. For internal propaganda, the flow of direction is from the Central Committee Secretariat directly to Agitprop, thence to domestic propaganda media through Agitprop functional sections. For external propaganda, the flow


of direction is from the Secretariat through Agitprop, coordinating with the Foreign Section of the Central Committee and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inform and direct Communist diplomatic and other missions of propaganda policy.


Propaganda guidance reaches the "national" Communist parties and front organizations in several ways. Normal methods of "guidance" and "exchange of experience" (instruction) are overt. TASS transmissions often contain propaganda instructions in the form of "news items." The CPSU theoretical journal Kommunist interprets the party line on a monthly basis. Agitator's Notebooks, published every ten days in almost every language, interpret the party line on timely subjects of both domestic and international interest--usually treating one or a very few themes. Pravda and Izvestia editorials also guide propagandists in determining the "correct" line on current issues, and Soviet delegations to foreign nations occasionally help in transmitting Moscow directives to local party organizations in the countries they are visiting.

The domestic propaganda line is directed downward from the higher echelons of the CPSU through a variety of channels. Mats for the party newspaper Pravda are flown daily to all parts of the USSR. Pravda is recognized as the voice of the Central Committee and relied on by provincial party and government officials for authoritative direction in setting the official line. At every level of administration, there exists a party body with its own Agitprop Section, which has its own personnel in key positions in all local communications media as well as in important factories and other enterprises. In addition to those organizations which are overtly responsible to the Soviet Communist Party, there are a number of bodies which although ostensibly independent are actually controlled by the party through their top officials, who are party members. These bodies--such as the trade unions; the friendship societies with foreign countries; professional unions of writers, artists, teachers, journalists, film workers and others; the Academy of Sciences and its affiliated scholarly societies--all have their own highly centralized organizations and journals, which disseminate the propaganda line throughout the membership.

Since party members are the leaders of every phase of Soviet life and occupy the key positions in almost all government, industrial, military, agricultural, scientific and cultural bodies, there is no facet of Soviet public activity which does not bear the stamp of the official party line.

# INTERLOCKING LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE OF CPSU GOVERNMENT OF USSR





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Projected International Communist Journal

The new international Communist monthly theoretical and informative journal entitled "Questions of Peace and Socialism," which was scheduled to begin publication in Prague in June, has not yet appeared, but steps have been taken to assemble a Soviet directed editorial staff.

### Background

During 1956, when the International Communist Movement was shaken by the publication of Khrushchev's "secret" report on Stalin, some CP leaders outside the Bloc urged the Soviet leaders to re-establish a central press organ or news agency to fill the gap caused by the abandonment in April 1956 of the Cominform journal, "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!" The Soviet leaders acknowledged the need for a central news and policy organ and promised to study the problem. At the same time, however, there was opposition within the movement to the re-establishment of centralized control, and this opposition extended to the creation of a new international journal, which simply by the exercise of normal editorial functions could hardly avoid giving the impression of centralized influence over the activities and policies of the Communist parties. This opposition carried over into the November 1957 conferences of Communist party representatives in Moscow, but a decision was made to establish a new journal,

### Establishment of the New Journal

The November 1957 decision was not officially announced, but in March 1958 a meeting was held in Prague of representatives of some Communist parties, and a communique was issued that the new journal would begin publication shortly. The communique failed to identify the parties participating in the Prague conference, but it is known that they included the Bloc CP's, as well as a number of Free World CP's. It has been announced that Aleksey Rumyantsev, former chief editor of Kommunist, theoretical organ of the CPSU, will be chief editor of the new journal.

The editorial staff is expected to include representatives not only of Soviet, Chinese, and East European CP's, but also some key Free World CP's (including Italian, French, Indian, British, and Latin American). The parties that are not represented directly on the editorial

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board will be "given the opportunity to join on equal footing or take part in the publication and work of the journal in any form that suits them," according to the communique issued following the March meeting in Prague.

The journal will be published in several languages and will be distributed by national CP's.